their continental shelves, the precise boundaries of the Area remain 'fluid.'6 However, to put the size of the Area into perspective, it constitutes approximately 260 million square kilometres, which is around 72% of the total surface area of the oceans.7 UNCLOS created the International Seabed Authority (ISA or the Authority), which is the autonomous international organisation charged with overseeing and administering a system for deep seabed mining.8 The ISA is responsible for regulating the Area and granting contracts (also referred to as licences) to explore for and exploit deep seabed mineral resources.9 The regime incorporates various key elements, including benefit-sharing aspects and marine environmental protections.10 Moreover, the ISA is empowered to develop a comprehensive Mining Code, intended to augment the regime and govern the entire lifecycle of deep seabed mining operations.11
In relation to deep seabed mining in the Area, the Convention defines 'resources' as 'all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the sea-bed, including polymetallic nodules.'12 Once extracted from the Area, such resources are referred to as 'minerals.'13 The Area and its resources constitute 'the common heritage of mankind.'14 As the UNCLOS deep seabed mining regime is not applicable to living resources, controversy remains as to whether marine genetic resources constitute part of the common heritage. 15 The focus of this Chapter is to provide an introduction to the Convention's deep seabed mining regime and the extent of commercial activities currently occurring within it. In order to conduct this analysis, Section 2 of this Chapter provides a brief snapshot of the regime's historical development. Section 3 then evaluates the current scope of the UNCLOS deep seabed mining regime and the manner in which commercial actors may participate within it. Thereafter, Section 4 provides a flavour of the status of commercial mining activities in the Area so far. Finally, Section 5 provides concluding remarks on the deep seabed mining regime.
The Development of the UNCLOS Deep Seabed Mining Regime
The mineral resources of the deep seabed have considerable economic potential. As early as the 1800s, the HMS Challenger expedition had already discovered the existence of polymetallic nodules on the deep ocean floor.16 However, the economic prospects of deep seabed resources only began to catch the international community's imagination half a century ago. During the 1960s, the prospective riches of the deep seabed began to seem within humanity's grasp. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, against the backdrop of decolonisation, entitlement to deep seabed resources became an ideological battleground, split into broadly two camps.19 In one camp were the industrialised States, favouring freedom for all States to exploit deep seabed resources on a firstcome, first-served basis. In the other camp were the developing States, fighting for a contrary system whereby deep seabed resources could be exploited only for the benefit of humanity.20 The latter camp were motivated by the realisation that without careful regulation, to allow freedom for all to exploit deep seabed resources would not be as egalitarian as it appeared.21 A free-for-all system would in fact preserve deep seabed mining as the domain of the small number of wealthy States possessing the relevant technical expertise, who would be in prime position to carve up the spoils between them.22
In a remarkable feat, after decades of wrangling, the developing States achieved their vision in many key respects. The UNCLOS deep seabed regime, which was finally agreed in 1982, is a unique scheme for common resource management. It is underpinned by the principle that the deep seabed constitutes 'the common heritage of mankind' and cannot be alienated unilaterally.23 This application of the common heritage concept to the deep seabed was a notion first formally introduced before the UN General Assembly by Malta's Ambassador, Arvid Pardo on 1 November 1967.24 In terms of the content of the common heritage concept, as commentary explains: 
The UNCLOS Deep Seabed Mining Regime
The UNCLOS deep seabed mining regime is contained within Part XI of the Convention and elaborated upon in Annex III, as modified by the 1994 Agreement. The provisions of Part XI of UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement are to be interpreted and applied together as a single instrument; but, in the event of inconsistency between them, the provisions of the latter prevail.36 In addition, the ISA is augmenting the regime through adoption of rules to regulate deep seabed mining.
The following analysis addresses the key features of the regime (3.1), the means by which commercial operators can participate within the licensing process (3.2) and the position of actors outside of the regime (3.3).
Key Elements of the UNCLOS Deep Seabed Mining Regime
The premise of the UNCLOS deep seabed mining regime is that the deep seabed and its resources are the 'common heritage of mankind'37 and mining activities 33 The 1994 must be carried out 'for the benefit of mankind as a whole.'38 Accordingly, the deep seabed mining system must take the interests of developing States into account and promote their effective participation.39 Moreover, the ISA is charged with developing mechanisms to guarantee equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from the Area.40 Another key element of the regime is the protection of the marine environment.41 Fundamentally, pursuant to the regime, States and other actors are prohibited from conducting unilateral deep seabed mining activities. No State or entity can unilaterally claim sovereignty over the deep seabed or its resources.42 Rather, all exploration and exploitation activities in the Area are subject to the permission and oversight of the ISA.43
As an international organisation, the ISA has international legal personality, entitling it to the full range of international rights and duties of an international person.44 The two principal organs which establish the ISA's policies and govern its work are the Assembly, in which all States Parties are represented; and the 36-member Council elected by the Assembly, which functions as the ISA's executive organ.45 The Secretariat is the ISA's third principal organ and it conducts the ISA's administration.46 The ISA is also assisted by its Legal and Technical Commission (LTC), which is an organ of the Council The ISA is a unique and unusual body with far-reaching institutional powers of a kind which are arguably unparalleled within the international legal system.50 It plays the crucial role of custodian of the deep seabed, a role which is enshrined in both UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement.51 The ISA's mandate is expressed most clearly in Article 157(1) of UNCLOS, which provides that '[t]he Authority is the Organization through which States Parties shall, in accordance with [Part XI], organize and control activities in the Area, particularly with a view to administering the resources of the Area.' The ISA is entrusted with the role of organising, implementing and controlling activities in the Area 'on behalf of mankind as a whole.'52 To that end, the ISA has the power to adopt rules and regulations to govern deep seabed mining activities, with the aim of developing a comprehensive Mining Code to regulate exploration and exploitation for all forms of resources in the Area.53
The Mining Code adds another layer to the Convention's byzantine deep seabed mining regime and constitutes secondary law by the ISA.54 The ISA is still in the process of creating a bespoke Mining Code to govern the entire lifespan of deep seabed mining operations. Thus far, the ISA has implemented three sets of regulations, which concern prospecting and exploration activities for three types of minerals (namely, polymetallic nodules, polymetallic 48 1994 Agreement, Annex, s9; see also s3(4), (7 sponsorship from a States Party will a non-State actor be entitled to submit an application to the ISA to conduct exploration or exploitation activities.62 Indeed, as the Seabed Disputes Chamber (Chamber) of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has emphasised, the 'notion of "sponsorship" is a key element in the system for the exploration and exploitation of the resources in the Area.'63 One purpose behind the sponsorship requirement is 'to achieve the result that the obligations set out in the Convention, a treaty under international law which binds only States Parties thereto, are complied with by entities that are subjects of domestic legal systems. ' States or State-sponsored entities seeking to explore for and exploit deep seabed resources must submit a plan of work for the ISA's approval. Once approved by the ISA and signed, the plan of work takes the form of a contract between the ISA and the contractor. 66 The UNCLOS regime was intended to function as a parallel system: States and State-sponsored entities would be permitted to conduct deep seabed mining activities in tandem with the ISA's mining arm, the Enterprise. 67 To that end, it institutes a site-banking system, whereby a contractor's plan of work must specify a total area for exploration or exploitation which is 'sufficiently large and of sufficient estimated commercial value to allow two mining operations' and 'indicate the coordinates dividing the area into two parts of equal estimated commercial value.'68 On that basis, the ISA designates one part of the submitted area as a 'reserved area.'69 Before the 1994 Agreement's modifications, the UNCLOS regime envisaged that mining activities in reserved areas would be conducted 'solely' by 'the Authority through the Enterprise or in association with developing States.'70 However, the 1994 Agreement suspended the role of the Enterprise for the time being.71
Under the present regime, the State or entity which contributes a particular area to the ISA as a reserved area now has the right of first refusal to enter into a joint venture agreement with the Enterprise for exploration and exploitation of that reserved area.72 In the event that that right of first refusal is not exercised, it is open for developing States and entities sponsored by them, including private actors, to apply to explore and exploit the reserved area. 73 In relation to sulphides and cobalt crusts exploration, the ISA modified the site-banking system further, permitting an applicant seeking permission to explore for sulphides or cobalt crusts to offer an equity interest in a joint venture arrangement to the Enterprise instead of submitting a reserved area.74 At present, the LTC is considering whether to amend the Nodules Regulations to align them with the approach to sulphides and cobalt crusts in this regard.75
Once exploitation commences, the ISA will oversee redistribution of financial and other economic benefits derived from the resources of the Area. These benefits are to be shared equitably, on a non-discriminatory basis, through a mechanism which the ISA has still to devise.76 Currently, deep seabed miners contemplating exploitation activities face continued levels of uncertainty, given that levels of fees and royalties and precise terms of exploitation contracts are still to be determined. However, despite this, the ISA's stakeholder consultation process provides a unique opportunity to harness input from a wide range of actors, including commercial operators and environmental experts.77 This process could facilitate achievement of an exploitation regime which allows commercially viable mining activities while ensuring appropriate safeguards for the environment and the common heritage principles at the heart of the regime.
Indeed, as Section 4 of this Chapter will demonstrate, notwithstanding the developing nature of the existing regime, participation in the Area is increasing. Various States, State actors and private entities are positioning themselves to take advantage of the perceived opportunities afforded by deep seabed resources. However, what is the position of actors which are positioned outside of the UNCLOS regime, such as States which are not parties to the Convention, or their nationals? This following Section will address this point. Certainly, the only definitive way in which NSPs can render their nationals eligible to undertake mining activities in the Area is through the ratification of UNCLOS. For example, as the US is not a party to UNCLOS, neither the US nor any US nationals are entitled to participate in the ISA's licensing system. Only by ratification of UNCLOS would the US be eligible to apply to the ISA for mining rights or to sponsor US entities who wish to obtain ISA approval to mine. Thus, only by acceding to UNCLOS could the US secure for itself and its nationals legally recognised, internationally enforceable deep seabed mining rights backed by investment protections and binding international dispute resolution options.85
The Position of Actors outside of the UNCLOS Deep Seabed Mining Regime
Any entity conducting mining operations in the Area without ISA authorisation -and absent the rights of exclusivity and security of tenure that an ISA contract affords86 -would expose itself to tremendous risk. Given the significant investment required to mount deep seabed mining operations, it does not seem credible that an actor would engage in mining activities without a clear legal basis and enforceable legal title. 87 This is borne out in practice: NSPs or their nationals are not in fact conducting mining activities in the Area outside of the UNCLOS regime.88 For example, the US maintains a domestic regime for exploration and exploitation of mineral resources in the Area: the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (US Act), which it enacted in 1980.89 At present, only two deep seabed exploration licences remain active under the US Act, and both of these are held by US defence giant, Lockheed Martin.90 However, as the US has recognised, in order for Lockheed Martin's US licence claims to be afforded 'international recognition' and security of tenure, the US would need to accede to UNCLOS.91 Indeed, the US Department of State opined that if Lockheed Martin proceeded with exploration activities absent such international recognition, this would violate its licence terms. 92 In September 2017, the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) addressed the interaction of these US licences with the UNCLOS deep seabed mining regime. Firstly, NOAA acknowledged that the US Act's 'express purpose' is to establish an interim deep seabed mining regime, pending US ratification of UNCLOS.93 As such, as NOAA explained, a licence under the US Act 'gives the holder the exclusive right to explore a specific area, but only as against other US entities.'94 On this basis, '[a]ny rights a US company may have domestically are not secured internationally because US companies are not able to go through the internationally recognized process at the [ISA] established for Parties to [UNCLOS] . '95 In fact, instead of proceeding outside of the UNCLOS system, NSP nationals are structuring their investments in a way that permits participation within UNCLOS. For example, operating within the framework of UNCLOS, the UK has sponsored two applications to the ISA by a British corporation seeking to explore for polymetallic nodules. Both applications were made by UK Seabed Resources Ltd (UKSRL), which was incorporated in May 2012 and is a whollyowned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin.96
Provided the test of effective control is met,97 the deep seabed regime contains no proscriptions to prevent a subsidiary constituted in the territory of a States Party and sponsored by that States Party from applying to engage in activities in the Area in this manner. Indeed, ITLOS has confirmed implicitly the freedom of commercial actors to set up companies in foreign States and acquire the nationality and sponsorship of those States.98 Although the Chamber cautioned against '[t]he spread of sponsoring States "of convenience"' , this was in the context of determining whether developing and developed States were subject to the same responsibilities and liabilities when acting as sponsoring States.99 Therefore, by pursuing deep seabed mining activities through a UK subsidiary, US national Lockheed Martin managed to circumvent successfully the legal restrictions upon its participation.
In light of the above, deep seabed mining activity outside of the UNCLOS regime appears unlikely to occur at present due to the commercial, financial and legal risks and uncertainty that it would involve for any entity.
4
The Extent of Commercial Activities within the Area
Commercial Prospects for Deep Seabed Mining in the Area and Environmental Concerns
A host of actors are now participating in deep seabed mining activities in the Area. Currently, these activities are still at the exploration phase. Long-term commercial prospects for the deep seabed mining industry remain uncertain given the high costs and technological challenges involved in deep seabed mineral extraction, compounded by other factors such as fluctuating metal prices and environmental concerns.100
Notably, deep seabed mining faces major opposition on environmental grounds.101 On that basis, in January 2018, the European Parliament called 97 See discussion at text to nn59-61 above. 98 ITLOS Advisory Opinion (n61) para 159. 99 ITLOS Advisory Opinion (n61) para 159 (the Chamber found that in order to prevent a race to the bottom, the regulatory burden must be equally applied to developing and developed States, otherwise corporations could choose to route their activities through the former to take advantage of lesser regulation Environmental controversy notwithstanding, the exploitation phase of deep seabed mining may begin in the coming years. 105 As the ISA's Secretary General remarked in February 2018, '[a]t a time when some appear to want to enter into an existential debate about whether deep sea mining should be permitted to go ahead or not, we do well to remember that the international community passed that point already many years ago.'106 Indeed, Michael Lodge, the current Secretary-General of the ISA, previously described the scale of deep seabed mineral deposits as 'staggering.'107 Based on industry projections, by 2030, deep seabed mining could constitute 10% of all global mining activity and have a value of around $65 billion in 2010 prices. 108 Notably, this level of activity would be only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the potential resources present on the ocean floor. For example, the value of gold deposits lurking on the deep seabed has been calculated at $150 trillion in 2013 prices. 109 As noted above, thus far, licences for exploration relate to three particular types of minerals: polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulphides and cobaltrich crusts.110 The first of these resource types, polymetallic nodules, are potato-sized rock deposits on the deep ocean floor, containing manganese, iron and other metals, such as copper and nickel. The second resource type, sulphides, generally contain iron, copper and zinc and may contain quantities of gold and silver. Most commonly, such sulphides emanate from hydrothermal vents on the mid-ocean ridge, where tectonic plates meet. Thirdly, cobalt crusts often form on rocky outcrops and ridges in the sea floor and contain elements such as manganese, iron, cobalt, nickel and lead. Each of these seabed deposits comprise relatively high concentrations of valuable metals as compared to equivalent minerals extracted on land.111 As terrestrial metal stocks become depleted due to rising material consumption, experts anticipate that corresponding costs will continue to rise.112 In this context, experts predict that metals extracted from the deep seabed will be increasingly sought after. 113 Moreover, seabed minerals may contain traces of rare earth elements (REEs).114 REEs are highly desirable commodities: critical for the manufacturing of green energy technology, such as solar panels, wind turbines and hybrid cars, and in the weapons industry. They are also essential in the electronics industry for production of high-tech gadgets such as smart phones, laptops and flat-screen televisions. The volume of REEs available from the deep seabed could potentially exceed global land reserves of REEs.115 In this context, global excitement is growing over potential deep seabed mining for REEs in both national and international deep seabed areas.116 Deep seabed mining for REEs could be a viable means by which to secure a reliable supply chain, insulated from potential geopolitical ruptures.
As the following Section will address, in pursuit of deep seabed resources, commercial actors have already made significant investments, and there are indications that commercial mineral extraction could begin in the Area in the years to come.117
Current Participants in Deep Seabed Mining Activities in the Area
As of the end of 2018, the ISA has entered into mining contracts with twentynine contractors for exploration in relation to the three minerals types currently regulated (nodules, sulphides and cobalt-rich crusts).118 These figures include a significant increase in the number of contracts granted in recent years. As recently as early 2011, the ISA had approved only eight applications for exploration; by late 2015, that figure had more than tripled.
The total area of deep seabed which the ISA has approved for exploration now surpasses 1. which nine contracts are for nodules exploration and the remainder concern exploration for sulphides or cobalt crusts). In terms of State or State-controlled activity, the nations which have been most active so far in securing ISA licences are China, Russia, and South Korea. These three States are the only ones to hold exploration contracts relating to all of the three types of mineral which are currently regulated. At present, China has the greatest number of licences of any State or national. China's fourth contract for deep seabed mineral exploration rights (and its second in respect of nodules) was signed in 2017 by the ISA and China's State-owned metals and minerals trading company, China Minmetals Corporation.
The remaining five ISA contractors are private corporations exploring for polymetallic nodules (with two active in reserved areas). The first private actor to enter a contract with the ISA for nodules exploration was Tonga Mining Offshore Limited (TMOL) in 2012.120 The contract concerns portions of reserved areas originally contributed by French, German and Japanese State entities and South Korea. A Tongan national, TMOL is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Canadian mining company Nautilus Minerals Inc (Nautilus).
In 2013, Belgian corporation, G-Tec Sea Minerals Resources NV (GSR), and UK corporation, UKSRL, both entered contracts with the ISA.121 In March 2016, UKSRL entered a second contract with the ISA for nodules exploration.122 As noted above, UKSRL is a subsidiary of the US defence giant, Lockheed Martin. The remaining private contractor in the Area is Ocean Mineral Singapore Pte Ltd (OMS), a Singaporean corporation with an ISA contract to explore for nodules in a reserved area originally contributed by UKSRL. 123 In addition to acting directly as contractors, some private corporations also have links to activities in the Area by State-controlled actors. For example, the Cook Islands Investment Corporation (CIIC), a State enterprise, entered a contract with the ISA in July 2016 for nodules exploration.124 CIIC entered into a joint venture agreement with GSR to jointly explore the area within CIIC's ISA contract, under the proviso that future profits would be shared equally between CIIC and GSR.125
In practical terms, joining forces with private actors may provide developing States lacking in technical capabilities and resources, one of the only viable means by which to become active in deep seabed mining.126 For example, in its application, CIIC stated that its combined approach with GSR would '[enable them] to enhance all relevant synergies in scientific, ecological and economical research and studies to the absolute maximum.'127
To sum up, exploration activities in the Area are increasing, and this is especially so for private corporate contractors. Despite remaining uncertainties concerning long-term commercial prospects of deep seabed mining, increasing investment in the industry gives a strong indication that it may soon proceed towards commercialisation.
Conclusion
In the coming years, commercial extraction of deep seabed minerals may become feasible. As this Chapter has explored, despite continued uncertainties and challenges within the deep seabed mining industry, commercial investment in deep seabed mining is growing, and the volume of exploration activities in the Area continues to rise. An increasing number of States, State entities and private investors are now participating in deep seabed exploration activities under the ISA's licensing process within the UNCLOS regime. In this context, the ISA Secretary-General anticipates that deep seabed mining beyond national jurisdiction is 'well within reach' and 'attainable in the foreseeable future.'128 Under international law, there is a detailed legal framework for deep seabed mining activities within the Convention and associated instruments, including the 1994 Agreement and the ISA's Mining Code. All deep seabed mining activities in the Area are occurring under the auspices of this UNCLOS regime.
'International Seabed Authority Contract Signing' (Cook Islands Investment Corporations Online News, July 2016) <http://ciiconline.com/latestnews/international-seabed -authority-contract-signing/>. In an interesting dynamic, the area which CIIC intends to explore is a reserved area which was originally contributed by GSR pursuant to its 2013 nodules exploration contract with the ISA. In practice, one key test for the future success of the regime will be the precise shape of the ISA's expanding regulatory code governing the exploitation phase, including its financial terms and environmental protections. Therefore, the ISA's current efforts to draft workable exploitation regulations, which takes on board the views of stakeholders in the industry, is a crucial movement towards the long-term realisation of a viable deep seabed mining industry in the Area.
